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Have Model, Will Reform: Assessing the Outcomes of Electricity 
Reforms in Non-OECD Asia
Anupama Sen,* Rabindra Nepal,** and Tooraj Jamasb***
abstract
Non-OECD Asian economies comprise about 34% of world primary energy de-
mand, 60% of population and 65% of the world’s poor, and will account for more 
than 60% of the total increase in energy consumption between 2015 and 2040. En-
ergy sector reforms in non-OECD Asia are thus significant for global energy use, 
sustainability and socio-economic welfare. The region has experienced a slow and 
difficult reform path and after more than two decades of reform efforts it is time to 
take stock of their outcomes. Using a novel dataset assembled for this purpose for 
the period 1990–2013 for 17 non-OECD Asian countries, we apply instrumental 
variables regression techniques to several electricity sector reform outcome mod-
els. We find that the standard reform model has had limited benefits, largely due 
to sectoral heterogeneity and institutional endowments. We also show empirical 
evidence of the theoretical trade-offs between technical efficiency, economic and 
welfare objectives of reforms. The results call for rethinking of the effectiveness 
of reforms and awareness of the effects of key reform steps on different outcomes. 
This is useful for balancing the trade-offs among competing reform objectives.
Keywords: market liberalisation, electricity restructuring, development, welfare
 https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.39.4.asen 
1. INTRODUCTION
The energy sector is currently undergoing worldwide introspection, following more than 
two decades of a trend towards liberalised markets in electricity provision. While partly related to 
the growing adoption of renewables, this is also concerned with the effectiveness of the original 
or ‘standard model’ of electricity reforms, which was pioneered in the 1980s and 1990s by OECD 
economies—the UK, Norway, Chile and the US. These reforms were aimed at improving the effi-
ciency of the sector, implementation of cost-reflective pricing based on competitive wholesale and 
retail markets and incentive regulation of distribution and transmission networks (Pollitt, 2004; 
Joskow 1998; Newbery, 2005).
The standard model, designed to move away from electricity provision by vertically in-
tegrated state-owned monopolies, typically comprised a set of measures, including (Sen, 2014; 
Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008; Joskow, 2008; Victor and Heller, 2007): (i) enactment of electricity 
reform legislation; (ii) opening the sector to private generation companies or Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs); (iii) corporatisation and unbundling of vertically integrated state-owned utili-
ties into competitive (generation and retail supply) and regulated natural monopoly (distribution, 
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transmission and system operation) functions and commercialisation of these; (iv) establishment of 
independent regulatory authorities; and (v) divestiture or privatisation of the sector.1 
The standard model spread to non-OECD Asian developing countries through a demon-
stration effect, largely predicated on multilateral lending programmes, but was intended to serve 
rather different goals from the developed economies. In the latter, it was targeted at market-oriented 
restructuring to improve technical and economic efficiency, and pass on welfare gains (e.g., through 
lower prices) to consumers. In non-OECD countries, the standard model was adopted to resolve dis-
tributional issues2, with governments assuming that market-oriented reforms would pass efficiency 
gains to consumers (Jamasb et al., 2017). Further, reforms were implemented against the backdrop 
of electricity shortages, weak institutions, and complex political factors. In contrast, the OECD 
countries enjoyed relatively stable economic and institutional conditions.3 
Consequently, the viability of the standard model for the heterogeneous institutional con-
texts of developing countries is debatable (Sen, 2014; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a, 2012b; Gratwick 
and Eberhard, 2008; Williams and Ghanadan, 2006; World Bank, 1993). Whilst in the OECD, the 
scrutiny over reforms relates to their suitability in delivering low-carbon systems (Keay, 2009; Keay 
et al., 2013), in non-OECD Asia it pertains to whether reforms have delivered the expected techni-
cal and efficiency gains, and whether these have translated into welfare gains for consumers. These 
issues merit a comprehensive empirical analysis of electricity reforms in developing Asia, focusing 
on the gap between anticipated and actual outcomes. The data set assembled is suitable for a focused 
study of the region and reduces the effect of omitted variables relative to a global study of reforms.
This paper seeks to address the following questions: to what extent has the standard model 
of electricity reforms in non-OECD Asia delivered the expected technical, economic and welfare 
gains? And, to what extent have the heterogeneous country-contexts in these countries influenced 
the reform outcomes? The answers to these questions have implications for electricity reforms in 
developing economies, and the literature: first, this is the first paper to empirically assess the multi-
dimensional impacts of key electricity reform steps in non-OECD Asia—a region central to future 
world energy use. Second, it applies econometric techniques to a new and original panel dataset of 
17 non-OECD Asian countries from 1990 to 2013, allowing for cross-country comparisons whilst 
controlling for institutional and political contexts. Third, it contributes to the reform literature by 
extending the literature, which has hitherto largely focused on partial analysis of technical impacts, 
and to some extent on economic impacts, to the welfare and distributional impacts of reform.
The next section summarises the electricity reform experience in non-OECD Asia. Section 
3 discusses the reform literature and presents the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the methodology 
and data, followed by the results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. ELECTRICITY REFORMS IN NON-OECD ASIA
This paper focuses on non-OECD Asian countries, for four key reasons. First, electricity 
reforms in the majority of these countries were initiated in the late 1990s (Jamasb et al., 2017), 
providing a clear starting timeframe for analysis. In contrast, the first wave of electricity reforms 
in other non-OECD regions such as Latin America was initiated in the 1980s.4 In many non-OECD 
1. With some exceptions—e.g., Norway (Bye and Hope, 2005).
2. E.g., expanding electricity (capacity) provision and extending basic access.
3. Corruption and patronage were prevalent in energy sectors of non-OECD countries (Victor and Heller, 2007).
4. Non-OECD Latin America has achieved 97% electrification, whereas in South Asia this is at 80%, indicating that 
energy related welfare issues have a different relevance in either region (WDI, 2017).
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Asian countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines), reforms were 
undertaken as part of Structural Adjustment Programmes linked to multilateral financial lending, 
providing a common starting context. Second, although the pace of reforms has differed, the elec-
tricity sector in non-OECD Asia has been characterised by the same underlying problems of inef-
ficiency, below-cost pricing, high technical and commercial losses, and weak institutions. Third, 
the 17 non-OECD countries in our analysis5 account for 34% of world primary energy demand, 
60% of population and around 65% of the world’s poor (IEA, 2014). Non-OECD Asia alone will 
account for more than 60% of the total increase in energy consumption between 2015 and 2040, 
with power generation needing to grow by 115% over 2015 levels to reach 17,835 Terawatt-hours 
(TWhs),driven by India and China which will collectively constitute 3.2 billion consumers by 2040 
(EIA, 2017; IEA, 2016). Electricity reforms in non-OECD Asia thus have significant implications 
for global energy use, sustainability and socioeconomic welfare. Finally, our regional focus is sup-
ported by evidence that reform measures are influenced by region-specific institutional contexts. For 
instance, Eberhard et al. (2016) argue that while IPP projects in Asia have faced significant hurdles, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa they have been relatively successful in bringing investment into the power 
sector.
Table 1 depicts electricity reforms in the 17 countries in our dataset against the main mile-
stones of the standard reform model (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008; Joskow, 2008). The IPPs were 
regarded in the early 1990s as a quick way to introduce competition into electricity generation. They 
transferred some risks to utilities and in some cases to consumers (through higher tariffs) through 
‘take-or-pay’ clauses in contracts. While some countries (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore) evolved to 
adapt to this risk, many struggled to harness IPPs to fit with their fiscal and institutional contexts. 
In India and Pakistan, the inability of utilities to recoup higher IPP tariffs from consumers who paid 
5. The 17 countries are: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. Our sample was constrained by the 
availability of data.
Table 1: Status of Electricity Reforms in Non-OECD Asia
 Independent    Open/Third  Distribution 
 Power Producers Regulator Unbundling Corporatisation Party Access* Privatisation 
Bangladesh √ √ √ √  
Bhutan √ √ √ √  
Brunei   √    √ 
China √ √ √ √  
India √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Indonesia √  √ √ √ 
Laos √     
Malaysia √ √ √ √  
Maldives √ √  √  
Myanmar √ √    
Nepal √ √ √ √  
Pakistan √ √ √ √  
Philippines √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Singapore √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Sri Lanka √ √ √ √  
Thailand √ √ √ √ √ 
Vietnam √ √ √ √  
*Open access has been implemented to varying degrees; mainly confined to large consumers (>1 GW).
Source: Authors
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prices below cost led to renegotiations and cancellations in the 1990s (Mukherjee, 2014; Kessides, 
2013). Regulations enabling third party access to networks in the 2000s meant that IPPs offered an 
alternative to inadequate public-sector investments through the auctioning of low-cost supplies.6 
Contextual events have frequently affected IPP projects in Asia. For example, the Philip-
pines in the 1990s contracted IPPs for about 40% of generation capacity, as did Indonesia (Wu and 
Sulistiyanto, 2013). However, following the Asian financial crisis a spate of renegotiations uncov-
ered allegations of patronage in the awarding of IPPs in both countries (Henisz and Zelner, 2002; 
Wu and Sulistiyanto, 2013). Similarly, political upheaval stalled IPPs in Thailand (Wu, 2005a). In 
smaller countries, Laos, Bhutan and Nepal have significant hydropower potential, some of which 
has been developed through IPPs. However, property rights and sovereignty issues have prevented 
progress (Strahorn, 2011).7 In China, the lack of grid integration meant that despite early entry 
of IPPs, capacity surpluses could not reach the deficit regions, making investments susceptible to 
regional supply and demand fluctuations (Wu, 2005b). The reorientation of multilateral financing 
towards clean energy has stalled IPPs in newly hydrocarbon-rich countries such as Bangladesh and 
Myanmar. Singapore is among the few non-OECD Asian countries to have liberalised its market, in-
corporating IPPs. However, oversupply and high gas take-or-pay clauses drove market prices down 
to short-run marginal cost, deterring new investments (Somani and Lim, 2014). Improvements in 
market design, such as setting up a futures market, were undertaken to resolve this issue.
The establishment of electricity sector regulators occurred around the early to mid-2000s, 
with 15 out of 17 countries (Indonesia and Laos being exceptions) having some type of regulator. 
However, in most cases these agencies are not truly independent from government. In countries 
where reform is lagging, the main issue faced by regulators relates to reforming tariffs to reflect 
costs (e.g., India and Pakistan). China has aimed at consolidating electricity regulation with other 
energy-related sectors to ‘protect other objectives such as health and safety, and environmental and 
consumer protection’ (Ngan, 2010).
Where markets have developed, issues include market power, in many cases exercised by 
state-owned companies; e.g., in Thailand the regulator is tasked with ‘promoting competition’ while 
contradictorily ‘supporting’ the position of previously dominant state-owned enterprises (Wisutti-
sak, 2012). In the Philippines, the regulator has struggled with politicised tariffs and market power 
exercised by government utilities (Santiago and Roxas, 2010). However, the literature on market 
power is mostly with reference to markets in developed economies with limited relevance to the 
markets of non-OECD countries (see, e.g., Wolak, 2003; Borenstein, 2003; Bigerna et al., 2016). 
Developing countries have tended to aim for competition for the market arrangements than compe-
tition in the market and very few can claim the existence of effective competition in their markets.
In smaller import-dependent countries such as Maldives, the regulator plays a critical role 
in the country’s trade balance.8 In Singapore, the regulator has successfully limited market power 
through regulating ‘vesting contracts’—bilateral agreements between generators and market sup-
port services licensees9 which require generation companies to sell a set amount of electricity at 
a specified price (Chang and Li, 2013). This limits the incentive for large generators to exercise 
market power via capacity withholding during scarcity periods to push up wholesale spot prices 
(Chang and Li, 2013).
6. In many countries this was from coal, which ensured lower tariffs but had adverse environmental impacts.
7. Indian investment in Nepal’s hydro infrastructure faced public protests over the acquiescing of sovereignty.
8. Maldives aims to achieve carbon neutrality in energy by 2020 (MMEE, 2010).
9. Which provide metering and billing services to consumers (Chang and Li, 2013).
Have Model, Will Reform / 185
Copyright © 2018 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
Unbundling involves the structural and functional separation of the sector into potentially 
competitive (generation and retail) and regulated (distribution and transmission) functions. While 
unbundling implies ‘accounting or legal separation’, corporatisation implies the commercialisation 
of unbundled entities or their incorporation as businesses under Company Law—mandating eco-
nomically motivated (as opposed to politically motivated) decisions. Although most countries have 
implemented unbundling and corporatisation, the public sector still dominates and in many cases, 
the finances of distribution companies have not improved. Although the logic of reforms implies 
that unbundling follows corporatisation, actual experience has varied. Brunei, Laos, Myanmar and 
Sri Lanka retained vertically integrated public-sector monopolies. They have relatively small power 
systems and Nepal and Jamasb (2012b) argue that in small systems, the creation of an independent 
regulator may be more effective than unbundling, particularly for politically less-stable countries 
and where hydropower is dominant. Several countries corporatized prior to unbundling, often sev-
eral years after corporatization (China, Philippines, Vietnam) (Dupuy et al., 2015).
Open/third party access to the grid is a critical enabling factor of reform, as it facilitates 
competition. First, consumers of public sector utilities are permitted to opt out of receiving supply 
from those utilities. Second, consumers as well as private sector generation and distribution are 
able to access network infrastructure. Open access has been implemented in just 5 countries, with 
obstacles. In India, the main impediment has been the imposition of ‘surcharges’ by public utility 
companies on large industrial users to compensate for the loss of revenue.10 In Indonesia, the state 
company PLN remains the sole owner of transmission and distribution assets with priority rights 
under the law to conduct its business. In Thailand, despite open access, public companies operate 
geographically segregated oligopolies and have majority shares in private generation companies 
(Wisuttisak, 2012). In Singapore, however, retail market liberalisation was carried out in two phases 
beginning in 2003, and roughly 80% of (contestable) demand is exposed to retail choice.
Brunei, India, Philippines and Singapore have privatised distribution networks. Singapore 
is the most advanced, with seven electricity retailers and the Market Support Services Licensee 
(MSSL) competing for (contestable) retail consumers. Privatisation in the Philippines’ distribution 
sector resembles a switch from public to private monopoly, as the National Power Corporation con-
trols the majority of electricity production through direct ownership shares in generation companies 
or long-term contracts with IPPs (Blank et al., 2012). In Brunei, the Berakas Power Management 
Company is a private limited company that owns and operates distribution substations and net-
works. In India, distribution has been privatised in two states: Orissa’s 1996 World Bank reform was 
carried out without restructuring or financial reform, and did not lead to the anticipated efficiency 
gains; Delhi’s 2002 reform was deemed relatively successful as the bids were awarded based on 
promised reductions in commercial and technical losses, and sharing the gains with consumers.11
3. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
3.1 Theoretical Underpinnings
The economic rationale for electricity reform has its foundations in microeconomic the-
ory and industrial organisation, in which a key objective is the maximisation of economic welfare. 
Standard theory suggests that welfare is maximised under perfect competition, as it drives prices (P) 
down to marginal cost (MC); in contrast, monopoly leads to a deadweight loss. This rationale has 
10. Industrial consumers cross subsidise agricultural consumers; hence in the absence of a tariff reform, open access has 
serious financial consequences for public utilities (Jamasb and Sen, 2013).
11. Delhi is a special case as it is a predominantly urban state with no agricultural consumers.
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evolved with technological advancements in the sector. Prior to OECD reforms in the 1980s/90s, 
the industry was seen as best organised around increasing returns to scale and cost efficiencies to be 
realised by a monopoly market structure.12 Under private ownership, a profit-maximising monopo-
list charges P>MC, resulting in a deadweight losses, and hence governments instituted public own-
ership assuming state-owned companies would not maximise profits, improving consumer welfare 
(Steiner, 2000).
The regulated public monopoly model also enabled pursuit of welfare policies, such as 
income distribution and universal service goals.13 However, the risk of regulatory capture by inter-
est groups (e.g., political constituents), led governments to direct public monopolies to set prices 
close to variable costs of production, constraining their return, and preventing them from making 
investments. This adversely affected quality and access to services, increasing the fiscal burden on 
the government14 and defeating the original purpose of state-owned provision (Armstrong and Sap-
pington, 2006). The lack of strong institutions compounded these effects and has indeed been the 
experience in most non-OECD Asian countries.
Technological advancements reduced the minimum efficient scale of operation, enabling 
the functional decomposition of the industry (Steiner, 2000), which provided the momentum to-
wards reform and building blocks of the standard model. Replacing regulation with competition 
could increase operational efficiency15 (Newbery, 1996; Steiner, 2000) with positive effects on out-
put and economic activity (Mohanty, 2015), and market liberalisation was seen as facilitating com-
petition. Armstrong and Sappington (2006) argue that the greatest gains from competition tend to 
arise when industry scale economies are limited relative to consumer demand; the industry regulator 
has limited information, limited resources and limited instruments with which to craft policy; the 
regulator’s commitment powers are limited; and, subsidisation of some of the dominant supplier’s 
services is not critical or can be achieved by means other than through the price structure—e.g., 
through replacing universal subsidies with targeted direct cash transfers.16 
Privatisation was not necessary to engendering competition, as some countries (e.g., Nor-
way) implemented competitive reform under public ownership (Newbery, 2006); however, relative 
to monopoly, private companies’ focus on lowering costs could generate a higher surplus within a 
competitive market structure (where P=MC), and thus be welfare-enhancing for consumers. The 
removal of entry barriers was seen as crucial to enhancing competition. But as the industry proceeds 
towards greater competition, market power may shift from being exercised through pricing to being 
exercised through capacity, and it was argued that regulation should be replaced with anti-trust over-
sight authorities (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). Theory postulates that there are instruments 
that could engender greater competitiveness in the transition towards ‘full’ competition (e.g., a sys-
tem of auctioning (or bidding) franchises may capture much of the surplus for consumers).
Three arguments emerge from the theoretical rationale underpinning electricity reforms:
•  Reforms are expected to lead to gains in operational efficiency in the sector,
12. As the number of consumers supplied by a utility increased, reserve margin requirements decreased because the 
grouping of heterogeneous consumers pooled the risk faced by the supplier, avoiding duplicative fixed costs (Steiner, 2000; 
Armstrong and Sappington, 2006).
13. A private profit-maximising monopolist would have a preference for serving low-cost areas which exclude more 
expensive to serve, unconnected consumers in rural areas (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006).
14. If, e.g., the government compensates the company through the national budget.
15. A wealth of literature exists on this, covering aspects such as the Averch-Johnson effect (Steiner, 2000).
16. E.g., financial support might be provided directly to the poorer groups of consumers; replacing implicit subsidies 
with explicit subsidies to those with the greatest need (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006).
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•  Gains from reform have a positive effect on output and economic activity, and
•  Reforms are expected to have a positive impact on consumer welfare.
Theory also explains, to an extent, why the anticipated outcomes may not materialise in 
certain contexts. Under vertically integrated public ownership in countries with weaker overseeing 
institutions, prices are often set below costs at the outset (i.e. average costs (AC) < MC), to sub-
sidise poorer consumers through the pricing system—or for reasons of political patronage (Victor 
and Heller, 2007). Kahn (1979) argues that liberalisation can be welfare-enhancing only when AC 
> MC, as competition can drive down system AC and potentially final prices. When AC < MC at 
the outset, rising prices and hence worsening consumer welfare are a more likely early outcome as 
pricing distortions are corrected. Nevertheless, competition can be welfare-enhancing when com-
bined with payments to worse-off consumers (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). However, a cash 
transfer to the worse-off consumers was not a standard element of the early reform programs. This 
reasoning explains why: (a) the actual outcomes may have differed from anticipated outcomes in 
the developing countries of non-OECD Asia; and (b) the experience may have varied even between 
countries in non-OECD Asia, due to vastly differing institutional and economic contexts.
3.2 The Gap in Empirical Literature
The sections above highlight some contextual differences between OECD countries, and 
non-OECD countries implementing the standard reform model, outlining the need for assessments 
of outcomes that explicitly take this distinction into account. Jamasb et al. (2017) provide a quali-
tative review of electricity reforms in developing countries, underscoring this difference. Yet, em-
pirical assessments of reforms have tended to focus on OECD countries, or use mixed panels of 
developed and developing countries, which obscure the differing contexts against which they have 
been implemented and limit the interpretation of outcomes.
‘Reforms’ in the empirical literature are measured against the individual milestones or 
measures (Table 1) that form the standard model, or against an index combining these measures. The 
majority of studies have focused on assessing the impact of reforms on operational or technical effi-
ciency, most of which find positive outcomes. The main variable used to model efficiency has been 
transmission and distribution (T&D) losses, partially due to the consistency of measurement across 
countries and partially to data availability. Seminal studies include Cubbin and Stern (2004; 2006) 
which applied OLS regression to panel data for 28 developing countries, concluding that regulation 
improved per capita generation and installed capacity; Nagayama (2010) which applied fixed ef-
fects models to 86 developed and developing countries, concluding that reforms (IPPs, unbundling, 
regulation and wholesale markets) reduced T&D losses; and Erdogdu (2014) which used panel data 
on 55 developed and developing countries with fixed and random effects models, concluding that 
reforms led to higher electricity ‘self-sufficiency’ (e.g., through better utilisation). A sub-literature 
on productivity and efficiency analysis of utilities concludes that the distribution of efficiency gains 
relies on the strength of the regulatory framework (Jamasb et al., 2005; Malik et al., 2015).
A limited number of studies have focused on extending the impact of improved operational 
efficiency to output and economic activity. Cubbin and Stern (2004; 2006) used panel data for 28 de-
veloping countries and 21 years using fixed effects OLS to conclude that regulatory law and higher 
quality regulatory governance had positive impacts on per capita electricity generation and installed 
capacity. Sen and Jamasb (2012) used bias corrected least squares regressions on a panel dataset 
of 19 Indian states spanning 16 years to show that reforms had a net positive impact on state-level 
GDP. Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) measured the impact of reform indices on economic outcomes 
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(including installed capacity and per capita GDP) to conclude that positive outcomes were observed 
only alongside the implementation of wider economic and institutional reforms. Vu and Gurtoo 
(2014) explore the contributions of the South Asian utility sector to GDP and employment (growth 
and average labour productivity) using econometric methods.
Very few studies have investigated the impact of reforms upon welfare, in two ways, di-
rect and indirect. Direct studies have focused upon the effects of reforms on electricity prices on 
the premise that a reduction in prices (e.g., through greater competition) yields higher consumer 
surplus. Evidence has been mixed. Amongst studies that use a composite index of reform, Sen and 
Jamasb (2012) in an econometric study on 19 Indian states, find that electricity prices increased 
in the early stages of reform. Erdogdu (2013) used fixed and random effects models on 63 devel-
oped and developing countries over 27 years with no conclusive impact on price-cost margins or 
cross-subsidy levels. Nagayama (2009) uses ordered response, fixed and random effects models 
for 78 developed and developing countries from 1985–2003 and concludes that high prices tend to 
drive liberalisation, but liberalisation does not necessarily reduce prices. Studies that decompose the 
impact of individual reform steps yield more conclusive results—ESMAP (2011) used panel data 
for 20 countries, concluding that unbundling and independent regulation reduced prices by 10%. 
As argued earlier, electricity prices in developing countries may rise, rather than fall, following 
reforms, due to the ex-ante existence of pricing distortions—therefore it is difficult to draw clear 
observations on welfare from this measure.
The second (indirect) channel pertains to the wider welfare improvements through elec-
tricity provision—such as access and knock-on effects on income and socioeconomic development, 
which is relevant to Asian developing country contexts, and has been under-explored. ESMAP 
(2011) uses panel data for 20 developing countries to show that independent regulation increased 
electricity access substantially. Khandker et al. (2012a; 2012b) use maximum likelihood probit 
models to examine the impact of electrification on household income. Vu and Gurtoo (2014) extend 
to socioeconomic development and poverty reduction. Jamasb et al. (2017) argue that most welfare 
studies consist of qualitative case studies combined with social cost-benefit analysis at the utility 
level, or micro level single-country cross-sectional household survey data.
Lopez (2003), Estache (2003) and Calderon and Severn (2004) establish links between in-
frastructure and welfare improvements, which have been applied to electricity and questions around 
access by Brenneman and Kerf (2002), Leipziger et al. (2003) and Khandker et al. (2012a). In order 
for infrastructure expansion to reduce income inequality, it must improve access and/or enhanced 
quality particularly for low-income households. Lee et al. (2016) find evidence from Africa that so-
cial welfare consequences of rural electrification are closely tied to organisational performance and 
economic and political institutions. Household electrification in their study is seen to reduce social 
welfare, due to leakages, bureaucratic red tape, low grid reliability and household credit constraints.
A final area of empirical work pertinent to this paper is the effect of country characteris-
tics—resource endowments and institutional heterogeneity—on reform outcomes, which should be 
a critical consideration of any reform programme. Weinmann and Bunn (2004) show how industry 
structure and resource endowment of a country affect the feasibility of reform; Nepal and Jamasb 
(2012a) relate the effectiveness of reforms to wider institutional indices of governance, finance, 
and infrastructure for a panel of 27 transition economies; Erdogdu (2013) investigates the impact 
of political economy on the electricity reform process for 55 developed and developing economies; 
and Balza et al. (2013) utilise a ‘polity’ index capturing relative autocracy or democracy for 18 
Latin American countries and use Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimations to conclude that 
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privatisation is robustly associated with improvements in quality and efficiency, but not with access, 
whereas regulatory quality is strongly associated with better quality and access.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways: it is the first study to assess the im-
pacts of electricity reforms in non-OECD Asian countries, recognising their common underlying 
contexts and region-specific issues as described in Section 2. Second, it extends the literature which 
has hitherto largely focused on the analysis of technical impacts, and to some extent on economic 
impacts, to consider the welfare and distributional impacts of reform which relate directly to the pol-
icy challenges faced in non-OECD Asia. Third, it applies econometric techniques to a new dataset of 
non-OECD Asian countries allowing for cross-country comparisons in this important region of the 
world whilst controlling for institutional and political contexts.
3.3 Hypotheses
We develop our empirical method through three hypotheses exploring the technical, eco-
nomic and welfare impacts of reforms for non-OECD Asia. We assemble a set of indicators which 
reflect the impacts of electricity reform, and regress reform measures (with relevant controls) on 
these indicators, whilst controlling for institutional differences and differing resource endowments, 
using panel data on 17 non-OECD Asian economies for 1990–2013. The choice of variables is 
informed by the literature, and by data availability.17 Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendices contain 
descriptive statistics and correlations for our dataset.
H1. Electricity reforms in non-OECD Asian countries have resulted in improved technical 
efficiency.
We use transmission and distribution (T&D) losses per capita as the dependent variable. 
There are two factors underpinning this. First, as stated in Section 1, a key objective of non-OECD 
countries in adopting the standard reform model was to resolve distributional issues, as governments 
assumed that productivity improvements and efficiency gains would be passed through to consum-
ers (Jamasb et al., 2017). Reforms were therefore targeted at improving efficiency across the entire 
supply chain. In non-OECD countries where vertical integration was the immediate precursor to 
reform, T&D losses concealed not just technical but also commercial inefficiencies—the latter in-
cluded commercial losses from unmetered consumption. Unbundling of the main constituent func-
tions of the sector can help in making the inefficiencies of the different functions, including the T&D 
losses, visible and thus easier to address, even in the absence of incentive regulation of networks, 
which is uncommon in non-OECD Asia.
Tongia (2007) shows how in India utilities concealed these losses by categorising them as 
‘agricultural consumption’, as well as losses from power theft (Victor and Heller, 2007). Second, 
many OECD country studies tend to use measures of generator performance at the plant level—in-
cluding capacity factors, vintage and unit configurations. However, such data, disaggregated to plant 
level, is not publicly available for most of the non-OECD Asian countries in our sample. Further, a 
cross-country study such as ours raises data issues related to variable definition and standardisation 
of measurement. It is for this reason that even existing cross-country empirical literature on reforms 
17. See Table 3.
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in developing countries utilises T&D losses (measured by the World Bank) as an indicator for tech-
nical impacts.18 
The main explanatory variables include a ‘reform index’, drawing from Balza et al. (2013), 
Nepal and Jamasb (2012a), Sen and Jamasb (2012), Nagayama (2007), Cubbin and Stern (2005), 
and Hattori and Tsutsui (2004), made up of six measures: (a) IPPs in generation, (b) an electricity 
regulator as a separate, distinctive body,19 (c) unbundling of the state utility, (d) corporatisation of 
the utility, (e) open / third party access to networks, and (f) distribution privatisation. The reform 
index and individual measures are informed by the reform characteristics of the non-OECD Asian 
countries. While unbundling and corporatisation are synonymous in the standard reform model, cor-
poratisation (incorporation of a utility under the ‘Companies Act’) by itself implies commercialised 
operations. Most non-OECD Asian countries do not have regulators that are truly independent from 
government. Dummies (0/1) are assigned to each measure.
We control for institutional differences between countries using an internationally rec-
ognised composite transparency index—the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)—which is based 
on a combination of institutional surveys, and is a widely used indicator of institutional effective-
ness.20 Stronger institutions and governance enable transparency of operations, less rent-seeking 
and more effective outcomes. Per capita power consumption is included as a control variable—as 
higher power consumption in absolute terms could lead to higher T&D losses, and consumption is 
the residual of generation after losses.21
H2. Electricity reforms in non-OECD Asia have led to positive impacts on output and economic 
activity.
The second hypothesis draws from earlier studies such as Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) and 
Sen and Jamasb (2012) which utilise per capita GDP as the dependent variable. The reform impacts 
on per capita GDP has also been the subject of several studies based on computable general equilib-
rium models (Chisari et al., 1999; Benitez et al., 2001; Boccanfuso et al. 2009a, 2009b). Explanatory 
variables used are the reform index and individual reform measures. We control for institutional 
differences using the transparency index, and differences in initial resource endowments using per 
capita total installed capacity.22 We extend the scope of this hypothesis by including a secondary 
indicator of economic activity which measures an economy’s openness to electricity trade23 by es-
timating a second equation that uses per capita electricity trade (as electricity exports plus elec-
tricity imports as a percentage of total electricity generation)24 as a dependent variable. As several 
18. A limitation of using a per capita measure of T&D losses is incomplete electrification rates in some countries in our 
dataset. We use per capita measures to address this.
19. Whether independent or not.
20. The CPI is a country-specific composite index measuring perceptions of corruption in the public sector. It is the only 
internationally recognised, cross-country dataset measuring governance and institutional capacity. The detailed methodology 
and dataset are freely downloadable from http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail.
21. About 90% of the losses (commercial, non-commercial and outages) occur at the distribution level (Hammond and 
Waldron, 2008; Nepal and Jamasb, 2013). The T&D losses data mostly captures the ‘D’ network energy losses since the ‘T’ 
losses are minimal across all systems. For this reason, we do not include the length of transmission lines as a control variable, 
as per capita consumption serves as a better proxy.
22. While an alternative would be to use some indicator of primary energy reserves, installed capacity is more suitable 
as it represents the existing infrastructural capacity to deliver resource endowments to the population. Further, this captures 
the cumulative effects of resource endowments in a dynamic rather than static form.
23. Following Frankel and Romer (1999) that examines the links between trade and economic growth by region.
24. This is consistent with the World Bank World Development Indicators’ definition of trade.
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countries in developing non-OECD Asia are generously endowed with hydroelectric resources, we 
subtract hydroelectric capacity from total installed capacity and include it separately as a regressor 
in order to account for its effect.
H3. Electricity reforms in non-OECD Asia have led to positive welfare impacts.
The third hypothesis extends the impact of reforms to socio-economic welfare. As seen 
above, the literature on this is extremely limited, as is the availability of consistent data on indicators 
such as price, which would be representative of direct impacts on consumer surplus. We therefore 
focus on indicators that reflect welfare in a broader sense, through the impact on access and income, 
following the literature discussed above.
We carry out two estimations, each of which uses a dependent variable that is consistently 
measured across the countries in our dataset. The first is the Gini coefficient, which captures the wel-
fare impact through changes in income distribution. There are two factors underpinning this. First, 
existing evidence shows that inequality in income mirrors inequality in final electricity consump-
tion—in other words, there is a marked correlation between the Lorenz curves of income inequality, 
energy inequality and inequality of electricity use (Grubler et al., 2012).25 And second, in OECD 
countries, power sector reforms were expected to lower the cost of producing electricity through 
productivity gains and change the relative prices charged to households and businesses, improving 
the distribution of income.26 We therefore test for this impact in non-OECD Asia.
Our second indicator is the Human Development Index (HDI), which covers social wellbe-
ing in a wider sense through its representation of standard of living, educational attainment and life 
expectancy in a society.27 Our econometric estimation takes into account the effects of other unob-
served variables upon the welfare indicators. The transparency index and per capita electric power 
consumption are included as controls; the former in order to contextualise the implementation of 
reform, and the latter to control for the efficiency of energy usage.
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
4.1 Method
Our dataset constitutes an unbalanced panel with 17 cross-sections from 1990–2013. Each 
cross section represents a non-OECD Asian country, with country-specific unobserved factors influ-
encing the behaviour of each. The starting point for this analysis is to run an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) model with robust standard errors as a benchmark model, which we then test and refine. 
An obvious option is to use a fixed effects panel estimation in order to control for country-specific 
observable and unobservable heterogeneity. The basic specification for a fixed effects model is: 
α β η ε= + + +it i it i itY X . 
25. Grubler et al. (2012) plot the Lorenz curves of energy inequality, measuring cumulative global population (in per-
cent) disposing of corresponding fraction of cumulative income (in percent of PPP$), final energy, and electricity use (in 
percent of Joules energy used) for the year 2000 to clearly show this relationship.
26. For example, in Australia, electricity reforms are estimated by the Australian government to have led to capital, 
labour and fuel productivity improvements and subsequent price reductions (of up to 29%) for some consumers in the mid-
1990s (Productivity Commission, 1996).
27. Measured through per capita income, mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling, and life expectancy 
at birth.
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However, our dataset has a finite and relatively small time dimension, ‘T’ and it is estab-
lished in the literature that a LSDV model biases estimates when T is small; thus, LSDV performs 
well when T is large (Judson and Owen, 1999). Kiviet (1995) devised a bias-corrected LSDV esti-
mator (LSDVC), later refined by Bun and Kiviet (2003), which is generally seen to have the lowest 
Root Mean Square Error for panels of all sizes; its applicability was, however, limited to balanced 
panels. A version of the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) for unbalanced panels was de-
veloped by Bruno (2005), which operates under two assumptions; first, it has a strictly exogenous 
selection rule, and second, it classifies the error term ε it as an ‘unobserved white noise disturbance’. 
However, we cannot rule out endogeneity amongst our regressors, which violates the exogenous 
selection rule of LSDVC. A number of consistent Instrumental Variable (IV)28 and Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM)29 estimators are proposed in the literature to overcome endogeneity 
(see Baum et al., 2003), and we therefore run our estimations using an instrumented variable regres-
sion (using the STATA routine ivregress).30,31 This fits a linear regression of depvar on varlist1 and 
varlist2, using varlistiv (along with varlist1) as instruments for varlist2.32 It supports estimation using 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) and GMM estimators.
The model estimated under this routine is as follows:
0 1                 β β= + +i i iY X u , 1, ..,= ……i n    (Structural equation) (1)
0 1= Π + Π +i i iX Z v             (First-stage equation) (2)
where iY  is the dependent variable, Xi represents the endogenous regressors, iu  is the error term rep-
resenting omitted factors that determine , iY iZ  is the instrumental variable used to isolate that part of 
iX  that is uncorrelated with iu , 0  Π  is the intercept, 1Π  is the slope, iv  is the error term.
The literature on the OECD countries has tended to argue that reform is a largely endoge-
nous decision. Kwoka (2008) in a study of US states that restructured their electricity sectors versus 
those that did not restructure, in relation to the impact on retail electricity prices (the dependent 
variable) argues high prices in some US states at the outset may have caused them to restructure 
their power sectors in the first place. However, in non-OECD Asia, the decision to adopt the ‘stan-
dard model’ was arguably not endogenous; instead, the standard reform model was part of wider 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) externally imposed on countries by multilateral agen-
cies over a period spanning the 1990s/early 2000s. It was also a result of ‘demonstration effect’ in 
the adoption of standard model in non-OECD Asia following on from non-OECD Latin America 
(Nepal and Jamasb 2012a). As the impacts of individual reform measures yield greater insights than 
the composite reform index, we drop the latter (Trfms) from our estimations.
28. Baum (2006); Wooldridge (2010; 2013).
29. Hall (2005).
30. The syntax for ivregress assumes that you want to fit one equation from a system of equations or an equation for 
which you do not want to specify the functional form for the remaining equations of the system. An advantage of ivregress is 
that we can fit one equation of a multiple-equation system without specifying the functional form of the remaining equations.
31. A concern was raised by an anonymous reviewer stating that the analysis covers a period of time during which 
countries in the sample may have experienced volatile GDP growth. We therefore ran a fixed effects instrumental variable 
regression on GDP per capita with time dummies to capture the effects of time-varying shocks. We did not obtained signifi-
cant results (including for 1997—the year of the Asian financial crisis), and the R2 of our model is <0.5, indicating possible 
misspecification and/or small sample bias, which led us to use ivregress as a more robust estimation. Additionally, Indonesia 
and Thailand were the only countries in our dataset affected by the Asian financial crisis.
32. varlist1 and varlistiv are the exogenous variables, and varlist2 the endogenous variables.
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Kwoka (2008) states that “while not all models assessing policy effects necessarily encoun-
ter selection bias … good methodology requires recognition of and attention to the issue.” While 
reforms in non-OECD Asian countries were initiated through SAPs, the political economy literature 
shows that their continued implementation can be endogenous when the impact of rising prices 
risks creating public opposition and unrest to incumbent governments (Victor and Heller, 2007). 
Intuitively, the implementation of open access acts as a trigger for increasing electricity prices. This 
is because open access leads to a flight of ‘paying’ consumers (i.e. large industries which typically 
cross subsidise residential and agricultural electricity users in developing countries) from state-
owned utilities to non-state firms or captive generation, thus putting pressure on the state-owned 
utilities to raise their prices to compensate for the loss in revenue. Joseph (2010) and Tongia (2007) 
show that this has been the case for India; Wisuttisak (2012) discusses the case of Thailand). This 
intuitive reasoning leads us to identify open access (OAccess) as an endogenous variable and to in-
strument for it, but we also supplement this intuition with observations from the descriptive statistics 
and appropriate post-estimation tests described later in this Section. In choosing an instrument for 
OAccess, we need a variable that is correlated with open access, but is uncorrelated with the error 
term. As argued above, open access often requires an increase in electricity prices, and it is less 
likely that this increase will be implemented in non-OECD Asian countries where the public can 
vote out governments and likely to mount protests against price increases. Open access has limited 
direct measurability, but we instrument for it using an index of Political Rights (PRights)33 which 
essentially conveys the extent to which citizens have the right to participate in and to elect their 
government, and are hence more likely to influence endogenous government decisions on reforms.
A further requirement of our instrument for open access is that it should not impact the 
outcome variables (i.e. per capita GDP, HDI and Gini Coefficient) directly, other than through the 
endogenous variable (OAccess). Here again, there is no clear intuitive evidence of direct causality. 
For instance, in the case of GDP: China, which many argue has been the engine of global GDP 
growth over the past decade, scores at the lowest end of the scale (7—or the smallest degree of 
political rights) on the PR index. The same applies for other non-OECD Asian countries with strong 
GDP growth but low scores on PR (e.g., Thailand with a score of 6). Next, if we take HDI and the 
Gini Coefficient, again we do not find definitive evidence of direct causality between the PR index 
and either of these variables: Singapore, a non-OECD Asian country which scores low on the PR 
index (at 4), has high levels of HDI and income equality.
Finally, Table A.1 reports very low correlations between the PR index, GDP, HDI and Gini 
allowing us to infer that PR does not affect the outcome variables directly—these low correlations 
are indicative of the instruments satisfying the exclusion restrictions. PRindex is therefore intu-
itively and statistically a suitable instrument, not only satisfying the exogeneity assumption but 
also reflecting the complex political contexts of this region. In our estimation method, apart from 
additional exogenous variables specified, other exogenous variables that appear in the equation are 
automatically included as instruments, thus further accounting for the presence of endogeneity that 
33. PRindex is published annually in the ‘Freedom in the World’ report which began publishing in the 1950s, deriving 
its methodology from the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Index covers 195 countries. A country is awarded 
0–4 points for each of 10 political rights indicators, which take the form of questions; a score of 0 represents the smallest 
degree of freedom and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: 
Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government. A country or territory is then as-
signed a composite rating (between 1 and 7) for political rights, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 
the smallest degree of freedom, corresponding to a specific range of total scores. Description of the report’s methodology, 
including data sources and the questionnaire used to score the index, is available online at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/
methodology-freedom-world-2017
194 / The Energy Journal
All rights reserved. Copyright © 2018 by the IAEE.
is not statistically explicit. The results are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation,34 and 
we run GMM and 2SLS estimations to test for consistency. We report the R-squared (goodness of 
fit) statistic along the results, although the estimator suppresses it in some cases, or reports a low 
statistic; but R-squared has no statistical meaning for instrumental variables regression.35 Instead, 
we carry out two post-estimation tests to validate the robustness of our results. The first is a test of 
endogeneity, which tests whether endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous.
The second is a test of instrument validity where an excluded exogenous variable must 
be sufficiently correlated with the included endogenous regressions but uncorrelated with the error 
term to be a valid instrument. The GMM and 2SLS estimators perform better when instruments are 
strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors (Hahn and Hausman, 2003). A test of over-iden-
tifying restrictions can be further performed if there are more instruments than the endogenous 
variables. For the GMM estimations, the test for endogeneity is reported through the ‘C’ statistic 
(Hayashi, 2000), while for 2SLS estimations endogeneity is reported through the Wooldridge score 
test (Wooldridge, 1995) and regressions-based test (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978). The 
test of instrument validity for 2SLS and GMM estimations are based on the respective F-statistics 
for first stage regressions to judge the explanatory power of the instruments.36 In all cases, the F 
statistic exceeds 10, which allows us to reject that our instruments are weak based on Staiger and 
Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb (for one endogenous regressor). 
Our instrument (Zi) satisfies the three conditions for a valid instrument suggested by (An-
grist and Pischke, 2009) which requires that: i) the instrument is as good as randomly assigned; 
ii) the instrument satisfies the exclusions restriction and iii) the instrument affects the endogenous 
regressor. Our intuitive arguments for the first two conditions are presented as above, while the third 
condition is met by the ‘F’ statistics resulting from the first-stage regressions.
4.2 Data
The reform measures were constructed through a comprehensive survey of reforms by 
the authors of country-specific literature to ascertain the status and progress of electricity reforms 
in non-OECD Asia. The variables were scaled to per capita levels to control for size differences 
and were further standardised by carrying out log transformations (see Appendices for summary 
statistics).37 
Tables 2 and 3 describe the variables used and the results of post-estimation tests are re-
ported in Table 4. Other data used for this study are from recognised sources, limiting standardisa-
34. We used the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) weighting matrix in our regressions to account 
for serial correlations and potential heteroscedasticity based on the Newey-West estimator (1987) for the GMM regressions. 
For the 2SLS estimations, we tested if the coefficient on the lagged residual is statistically different from zero based on 
Durbin and Watson (1951).
35. See Stata manual http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/two-stage-least-squares/
36. A test of over-identifying restrictions when feasible to perform is reported in GMM Hansen J statistic (Sargan, 1958; 
Hansen, 1982) for GMM estimations. The test of over-identifying restrictions is based on the Sargan (chi) (Sargan, 1975) and 
Basmann (chi) (Basmann, 1957) test statistics for the 2SLS estimations.
37. We log transform all variables apart from the reform measures. Log transformations linearize relationships, to re-
move heteroscedasticity, and to obtain residuals that are approximately symmetrically distributed. Marginal changes in the 
explanatory variables are interpreted in terms of multiplicative (percentage) changes in the dependent variable. When both 
dependent and independent variables are logged (log-log relationship), the regression coefficients are interpreted as elastic-
ities. A log-level relationship (logY and X) is interpreted as: 1% y 100.( 1)β∆ = −e . However, we focus mainly on the direction 
of causality as we aim to investigate the high-level impact of reforms as opposed to the precise magnitude of the effects.
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tion problems. They include the World Bank World Development Indicators, International Monetary 
Fund, and Freedom House Index. The transparency (corruptions perception) index is originally 
compiled from: African Development Bank Governance Ratings, Bertelsmann Foundation Sus-
tainable Governance Indicators, Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index, Economist Intel-
ligence Unit Country Risk Ratings, Freedom House Nations in Transit, Global Insight Country 
Table 2: Summary of Hypothesis and Variables
Dependent Variable Explanatory Variables Control Variables
Technical Impact Per capita transmission 
& distribution losses
Individual reform scores Per capita electric power consumption, 
transparency index
Economic Impact Per capita GDP Individual reform scores Per capita total installed capacity, per  capita 
electricity consumption,  transparency index
Per capita electricity 
trade
Individual reform scores Per capita total installed capacity (minus 
hydro installed capacity), per capita hydro 
capacity, per capita electricity consumption 
transparency index




Individual reform scores Per capita electricity consumption, 
 transparency index
Source: Authors
Table 3: Variable Names and Units of Measurement
Variable Label Variable Name Units
Dependent Variables
PTdl Per capita transmission / distribution energy losses Percentage
PGdp Per capita GDP US$
PTrade Per capita electricity trade Percentage
HDI Human Development Index Score
GINI GINI coefficient Score 0 to 1
Explanatory Variables
Reform variables





OAccess Open/Third Party Access 0/1
Dprv Distribution privatisation 0/1
Physical variables
Pepc Per capita electric power consumption KWh
PCap Per capita total installed capacity KW 
PCap less hydro Per capita installed capacity minus hydro capacity KW 
PHydro Per capita hydro capacity KW 
Index variables
PRights Political freedom (Freedom House Index) Score 1 to 7
Trpi Transparency index Composite index
*Dropped from instrumental variable regressions; prefix L. in results tables indicates logged variable.
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Risk Ratings, IMD Competitiveness Yearbook, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian 
Intelligence, Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide, World Bank Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment, World Economic Forum Expert Opinion Survey, and World Justice 
Project Rule of Law Index.
5. RESULTS
Results are reported from the ‘benchmark’ (OLS) model in the first column of coefficients, 
and from the IV models using GMM and 2SLS estimators in the subsequent columns (Tables 5–7). 
The sizes of the coefficients are not significantly different between the benchmark and IV models, 
and neither are the size of the standard errors; but the results from the IV estimations are statistically 
robust to endogeneity (described in Section 4). Further, within the IV model, results are largely 
consistent across the GMM and 2SLS estimations. The discussion of results therefore focuses on 
the IV model. An initial reading of our results shows that the ‘standard model’ of electricity reforms 
implemented in non-OECD Asian countries has not definitively resulted in the anticipated positive 
impacts.
5.1 Technical impact
The results from our first hypothesis show that one of the reform measures—corporatisa-
tion—had a significant positive technical impact, leading to a broad 14% reduction in T&D losses 
in non-OECD Asian economies on average (Table 5).38 This is substantial given high T&D losses 
in many non-OECD Asian countries, and that the OECD average is 6–8%. In the OLS model, IPPS 
and distribution privatization tend to increase T&D losses—however they are not significant in the 
instrumented variables regressions. As expected, a percentage change in per capita electricity con-
sumption is associated with a rise in T&D losses; however, the magnitude of this increase (roughly 
60%) is very large. Regulation also appears to increase T&D losses in the IV results—this could 
be reflective of the limited autonomy of regulation in non-OECD Asia (supported by the negative 
coefficients for the transparency index (institutions) variable). The type of economic regulation 
such as cost-based versus incentive regulation may also be important which we do not capture in 
our modelling.
There is no consensus in the literature on the magnitude and impact of reforms on T&D 
losses: Nagayama (2007) finds that reform measures including IPPs, unbundling and regulation led 
38. The coefficients for log-level relationships are computed based on the interpretation set out in footnote 37.




(Ho = variables are 
exogeneous)
Validity
(Ho = Instruments are 
weak)
Endogeneity
(Ho = variables are 
exogeneous)
Validity
(Ho = Instruments 
are weak)
L.Pgdp (5.12)** (41.43)*** (3.4)* (49.16)***
L.HDI (4.98)** (21.74)*** (3.72)* (22.6)***
L.GINI (5.32)** (12.4)*** (21.54)*** (13.65)***
L.Ptdl (5.066)** (17.60)*** (3.7)* (19.47)***
L.Trade (23.86)*** (31.47)*** (21.64)*** (46.40)***
*/**/*** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively
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to lower T&D losses, while Smith (2004) finds that T&D losses increased after reforms in many 
developing countries. However, these studies were based on global data, whereas our analysis con-
trols for institutional and contextual differences between countries and previous literature supports 
the importance of these contexts. For example, Nepal and Jamasb (2012) in an econometric analysis 
of 27 transition countries find that reforms on their own did not produce significant effects on T&D 
losses, and that institutional factors along weak political commitment and implementation played 
an important role. Sen and Jamasb (2012) found that performance measures tended to worsen in 
India rather than improve in the early stages of reform, analogous with a Kuznets curve distribution.
5.2 Economic Impact 
The results show a largely positive economic impact from electricity reforms in non-OECD 
Asia measured in terms of per capita GDP, but no significant impact on electricity trade.
5.2.1 Per Capita GDP
Results are shown in Table 6 below. The presence of regulators has a positive significant 
economic impact (of a magnitude of 7–9%), in line with much of the literature (Cubbin and Stern 
(2006) find that higher quality regulatory governance leads to positive outcomes). Further, open 
access has a positive economic impact of the order of around 12% (significant only for OLS)—this 
is in line with the expectation that third-party access in non-OECD Asia relieves consumers from 
dependence on a single grid-connected utility. In India, open access enables large industrial con-
Table 5: Technical Impact of Reforms
L.PTDL























































R2 0.82 0.79 0.79
N 235 235 235
*/**/*** indicates significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively; standard error in parentheses
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sumers to generate their own electricity at a preferential location, and transfer it to plants using the 
state grid.
On the other hand, the presence of IPPs has a negative association with GDP, reflective 
of the mixed and largely negative early experiences with IPPs in non-OECD Asia as described in 
Section 2, which are mostly connected with the breakdown of bilateral contracts between IPP and 
often a single state owned utility (usually over pricing disputes), which as discussed, have been 
partly politically motivated.
Unbundling on its own also has a negative impact on GDP, but the positive result for cor-
poratisation underlines our early argument between the mere functional segmentation of the sector 
into its different functions, versus the additional ‘accounting separation’ which is more effective. 
The presence of a higher quality of institutions and transparency is associated with a substantially 
significant impact on GDP (around the order of 60%)—underscoring the role of this variable in cat-
alysing some of the reform outcomes (e.g., the lack of success with IPPs) in some countries. Higher 
per capita electric power consumption expectedly has a large positive impact on GDP.39
39. The use of per capita electric power consumption as a control for estimating the impact of reforms on economic 
output may raise concerns of reverse causality/simultaneity. While our instrumental variables estimation (2SLS) accounts 
for simultaneity problems, it is noteworthy that a large literature uses time series analysis to test whether energy causes eco-
nomic output or vice versa with little in the way of conclusive results or guidance on how to model the relationships (Bruns 














































































































































R2 0.87 0.86 0.86 R2 0.68 0.64 0.64
N 235 235 235 N 235 235 235
*/**/*** indicates significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively; standard error in parentheses
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5.2.2 Electricity trade
We do not find conclusive results for the impacts on electricity trade from reforms. Among 
the reform measures, while the OLS regressions yield a negative impact of IPPs on electricity trade, 
open access yields a large positive coefficient (40%); the former is once again reflective of experi-
ences with IPPs in non-OECD Asia, which have not always delivered intended outcomes (i.e. higher 
electricity output). The latter result (open access) can be construed as being essential to engendering 
the competition required to enable trade—but as it is not significant across the instrumental variable 
estimations we cannot draw firm conclusions from the OLS model alone. Distribution privatisation 
has a negative impact on trade, in the OLS model. Among other variables, higher per capita electric-
ity consumption has a large significant impact on electricity trade, reflecting that when faced with 
high electricity demand (and potential deficits), non-OECD Asian economies resort to cross border 
electricity trade (Singh et al., 2015).
Although well-functioning markets can aid regional electricity market integration, 
cross-border cooperation has predated reforms in most countries, occurring mostly through high-
level bilateral political engagement (Singh et al., 2015). In other regions such as South America, 
bilateral trade evolved into market integration, with firms replacing political actors, as trade was 
encouraged to reduce large regional price disparities (Raineri et al., 2013). A major constraint to 
electricity trade in non-OECD Asia has been the rise of resource nationalism in South Asia, partic-
ularly over hydro resources.40 This is reflected in our result that a percentage increase in per capita 
hydro capacity results in a 4% decrease in per capita electricity trade. Similarly, higher per capita 
installed capacity (minus hydro capacity) has a negative impact on trade (supporting higher domes-
tic availability and thus less need for imports). Finally, trade is not dependent upon the quality of 
institutions.
5.3 Welfare Impact
As discussed in Section 3, there are two channels though which electricity reforms impact 
upon welfare. The first and more direct channel is through the transfer of surplus to consumers 
through lower prices (and hence higher disposable income), and the second is the wider welfare 
impact catalysed through electricity infrastructure, access and quality. We explored both in separate 
estimations. There are a number of factors other than reforms which can affect welfare; we have 
accounted for these in our model specifications, as described in Section 4.1.
5.3.1 Income distribution 
The dependent variable in our first estimation is the Gini coefficient, which is a measure of 
income inequality between 0 and 1, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect 
inequality, and it captures both channels. The results show that different reform measures have had 
different directions and impact on the Gini coefficient (Table 7). While open access seems to improve 
the Gini coefficient, distribution privatisation is associated with an increase in income inequality of 
between 5–13%. This result is supported by our theoretical exposition (Section 3.1) which states 
et al., 2014). The results depend to a great extent on the techniques used, time series, and sample (country or countries) being 
analysed.
40. Strahorn (2011) discusses these largely political constraints. Resource nationalism appears to be a constraint when 
hydro resources are opened up to foreign governments rather than private sector firms.
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that the implementation of reforms in the absence of excess capacity and lack of cost-reflective 
pricing will have led to higher prices following distribution privatisation. This is also supported by 
other empirical literature (Nagayama, 2007; 2009; Sen and Jamasb, 2012).
However, the presence of a sector regulator reduces the Gini coefficient (and hence im-
proves income disparity) by roughly 15%. This result could reflect one of two conditions: first, a 
regulator could intervene in electricity provision to limit price increases for the poorer consumers; 
and second, it could reflect lump sum transfers (e.g., cash payments) made to the poorest consumers 
who would otherwise be left worse off by price increases (which as we have discussed are inevitable 
when market reforms are carried out in a sector where prices are set below costs). Countries such as 
India have implemented reforms alongside mandated lump sum transfers by regulators.
IPPs seem to worsen income inequality; this is a plausible result and is in line with the the-
oretical trade-off between efficiency and distributional equity—if the presence of IPPs does not re-
sult in increased electrification and increased access, high income groups are by default consuming 
more electricity. Most IPPs tend to be located in urban or semi-urban areas, where grid infrastructure 
is in place along with an incumbent utility to offtake the IPP’s electricity. IPPs are often brought 
in to plug supply shortages rather than increase competition or extend access, and as discussed in 
Section 3, private firms have more incentive to serve low-cost areas rather than poorer areas (which 
tend to be costlier to serve and have low average consumption). Other empirical literature supports 
this conclusion even for rural areas; e.g., Khandker et al. (2012b) using cross sectional household 
survey data for India for 2005 found that a larger share of gains from rural electrification accrued 
disproportionately to wealthier rural households. The results for the influence of institutions on in-
come inequality are, we argue, analytically intractable, and require further investigation.
























































































































R2 0.48 — 0.47 R2 0.124 — —
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*/**/*** indicates significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively
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5.3.2 Human Development Index
Over two decades of attempts at electricity reforms should arguably have had broader 
positive welfare impacts as measured directly by the HDI. Yet, our results show that reforms have 
failed to yield clear welfare improvements. This has not even occurred through ‘indirect’ channels, 
as discussed in Section 3.2, where previous literature finds links between electricity access and the 
HDI. Leipziger et al. (2003) explore the relationship between access to electricity and educational 
attainment, which is one component of the HDI. Cross-country econometric studies have also found 
positive impacts from reforms on the quality of service and on access, particularly from regulatory 
governance and independent regulation (Cubbin and Stern, 2004; 2006, ESMAP, 2011; Zhang et al., 
2005; 2008).
However, our results show no direct significant impacts of electricity reforms on the HDI, 
and the evidence is weak at best: for instance, a graphical depiction of the data shows a weak pos-
itive relationship between the HDI and per capita electricity consumption (see Appendices). There 
is an argument to be made, that the standard model of electricity reforms does not automatically 
improve access, and that access is instead provided through special and targeted electrification pro-
grammes. One could argue that reform measures such as independent regulation should facilitate 
this, and there is some (sparse) evidence form the literature (ESMAP, 2011) that regulation has in 
some cases facilitated increased access. However, as described earlier in this paper, post reform 
regulation under the standard model has not been independent in most non-OECD Asian developing 
countries, and that regulators have generally tended to be quasi–government organisations.
Table 8 summarises the impacts of explanatory variables from each of the three hypotheses 
(sector efficiency, economic benefit and welfare effect). Our main results can be summed as follows:
  The different reform steps implemented have had mixed impacts on sector efficiency and 
economic output,
  There is a trade-off between the technical and economic versus welfare impacts of elec-
tricity reform, and
  The institutional and contextual variables (control variables) have large significant ef-
fects on qualifying the outcomes of reform.
For instance, reform measures such as regulation and open access have positive impacts 
on economic growth and welfare. Conversely, privatisation of distribution has a negative impact on 
welfare as it leads to rising prices for poor consumers. Further, as we progress from technical and 
economic to welfare impacts, reforms have had a waning effect on improving welfare in non-OECD 
Asian developing countries—a surprising outcome given the long history (over 25 years) of reform 
implementation and the theoretical basis for carrying out reforms as described in earlier sections.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper has investigated the proposition from theoretical and empirical literature that 
the ‘standard model’ of electricity reform, developed over more than two decades, has led to im-
proved efficiency, higher economic surpluses, and the transfer of surplus to consumers in developing 
countries. Using data from 1990–2013 for 17 non-OECD Asian countries, we applied instrumental 
variable regression techniques and find a tension between the efficiency, economic and welfare out-
comes of the ‘standard model’, which can be reflective of wider trade-offs between the policy goals 
of efficiency, sustainability and affordability. We have therefore argued that the application of theory 
has not automatically translated into expected outcomes of electricity sector reforms, particularly 
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on welfare, in developing countries—partly due to weak institutional frameworks under which any 
technical and economic gains have not been passed on to consumers.
Our results underscore the point that the uniform application of the standard model without 
reference to the inherent heterogeneity that characterises the sectors and countries in our dataset has 
not resulted in the anticipated reform outcomes. These results are subject to the limitations of data 
availability as in most econometric studies of this kind and there remains considerable scope for 
extending the findings and reducing the effect of omitted variables as more data becomes available 
or by using case study analyses. There is also scope for constructing newer indices to more closely 
measure the welfare impacts of reform. However, our study remains pioneering in terms of exam-
ining the trade-offs among reform outcomes despite the existing data limitations and constraints. 
Since reform process and impacts are multidimensional, future research can shed further light on 




























Producers Ipps − (0.38) − (0.33) + (0.88)
Regulator Reg + (0.10) + (0.09) − (0.15)
Unbundling Unb − (0.18) + (0.13)




OAccess + (0.28) + (0.12) + (0.42) − (0.17)
Distribution 
Privatisation Dprv − (0.25) + (0.13)
Control 
Variables
Per Capita Electric 
Power Consumption Pepc + (0.62) + (0.50) + (1.40) + (0.11)
Transparency Index Trpi + (0.55) − (0.40) + (0.70)
Per Capita Total 
Installed Capacity PCap − (0.09)





Per Capita Hydro 
Capacity PHydro − (0.04)
** a + sign for these variables indicates a negative impact, and a − sign indicates a positive impact. Where the size of 
coefficients varies across estimations we report the IV-GMM result.
Have Model, Will Reform / 203
Copyright © 2018 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
the important trade-offs in reform outcomes with more data for which this study provides the over-
arching foundation.
The results of this study points to specific policy implications. First, in many non-OECD 
developing countries, there was a widening price-cost margin and cross-subsidy when liberalisation 
took place, implying that prices would need to rise after liberalisation (Erdogdu, 2011). If prices 
do need to rise to encourage the efficient use of electricity, other policy measures, such as fiscal 
transfers to poor consumers, are needed to ensure that the surplus obtained from competition and 
liberalisation is transferred to poorer consumers, enhancing welfare. This lends support to the use 
of direct cash transfer programmes for poorer consumers being implemented in some countries (e.g. 
India) alongside electricity reforms, which also make tariff reforms politically palatable.
Second, although the standard reform model is applied to the entire supply chain, it is ev-
ident that competition in generation has helped to lower costs and introduce the much needed new 
capacity, albeit through badly managed IPP programmes in non-OECD Asia. This implies a much 
greater role for competition in order to meet public policy objectives, even when there are policy 
constraints related to final price levels. This could be through effective use of auctions to select new 
generation plants. Structural reform measures—particularly corporatisation—have appeared to be 
successful in improving technical measures and economic impacts. Future work could focus more 
specifically on assessing country-specific outcomes in relation to the competitiveness of markets.
We argue for a revisiting of electricity reforms, which considers the welfare dimension 
that is critical to a developing region such as the economies of non-OECD Asia represented in the 
present paper. Although the description of a ‘new’ reform model is beyond the purpose and scope of 
this paper, a rethinking of reforms would entail taking greater advantage of competition and regu-
lation through the structural reform measures to lower system costs without raising average prices, 
or without raising prices to the poorest. A combination of competition, independent regulation, and 
stronger institutions is needed to enhance the ability of decision makers in order to manage the in-
herent technical, economic, and equity trade-offs involved in an electricity sector reform.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pgdp 408 12018.43 20227.9 123 78688.4
Ptdl 408 130.294 152.18 3.475 1152.9
Pepc 408 1426.97 2234.4 13.271 8514.9
PCap 408 .45608 .65878 .0059 2.5464
PHydro 408 .27109 .74214 0 3.8462
Trade 408 10.641 25.308 0 90.310
GINI 82 38.195 6.2435 27.6 62.69
HDI 131 6.4823 66.869 .347 766
PRights 408 4.8456 1.814 2 7
Trpi 235 3.565 1.964 .40 9.40
Ipps 408 .77941 .41515 0 1
Reg 408 .375 .48478 0 1
Unb 408 .3700 .48342 0 1
Corp 408 .56618 .49620 0 1
OAccess 408 .1348 .34193 0 1
Dprv 408 .15686 .36411 0 1
PCap less Hydro 400 .35648 .62936 .0018 2.546
Figure A.1: Scatter Plot of HDI and Per Capita Electricity Consumption

